The Radical Account of Bare Plural Generics

Bare plural generic sentences pervade ordinary talk. And yet it is extremely controversial what semantics to assign to such sentences. In this paper, I achieve two tasks. First, I develop a novel classification of the various standard uses to which bare plurals may be put. This “variety data” is important—it gives rise to much of the difficulty in systematically theorizing about bare plurals. Second, I develop a novel account of bare plurals, the radical account. On this account, all bare plurals fail to express propositions. The content of a bare plural has to be pragmatically “completed” by a speaker in order for her to make an assertion. At least the content of a quantifier expression has to be supplied. But sometimes, the content of a sentential operator or modal verb is also supplied. The radical account straightforwardly explains the variety data: Speakers’ communicative intentions vary wildly across different contexts

Unable to Do the Impossible

Jack Spencer has recently argued for the striking thesis that, possibly, an agent is able to do the impossible—that is, perform an action that is metaphysically impossible for that person to perform. Spencer bases his argument on (Simple G), a case in which it is impossible for an agent G to perform some action but, according to Spencer, G is still intuitively able to perform that action. I reply that we would have to give up at least four action-theoretical principles if we accept that G is able to do the impossible. We may be best off retaining the principles and thus rejecting Spencer's intuition that G is able to do the impossible. I then consider an argument for the claim that G is able to do the impossible that goes through the Snapshot Principle. I, however, deny that any true variant of the Snapshot Principle shows that G is able to do the impossible. Moreover, the counterexample to the Snapshot Principle that I develop also suggests that G is unable to do the impossible in (Simple G). The most natural explanation for why an agent is unable to perform some action in this counterexample extends to (Simple G). Next, I develop three error theories for why we might initially share Spencer's intuition that G is able to do the impossible in (Simple G). Finally, I consider a couple other "G-cases" of Spencer's and find them all wanting. Perhaps we are unable to do the impossible

Detection of Mines in Acoustic Images using Higher Order Spectral Features

A new pattern-recognition algorithm detects approximately 90% of the mines hidden in the Coastal Systems Station Sonar0, 1, and 3 databases of cluttered acoustic images, with about 10% false alarms. Similar to other approaches, the algorithm presented here includes processing the images with an adaptive Wiener filter (the degree of smoothing depends on the signal strength in a local neighborhood) to remove noise without destroying the structural information in the mine shapes, followed by a two-dimensional FIR filter designed to suppress noise and clutter, while enhancing the target signature. A double peak pattern is produced as the FIR filter passes over mine highlight and shadow regions. Although the location, size, and orientation of this pattern within a region of the image can vary, features derived from higher order spectra (HOS) are invariant to translation, rotation, and scaling, while capturing the spatial correlations of mine-like objects. Classification accuracy is improved by combining features based on geometrical properties of the filter output with features based on HOS. The highest accuracy is obtained by fusing classification based on bispectral features with classification based on trispectral features

Rule-based approach for identifying assertions in clinical free-text data

A rule-based approach for classifying previously identified medical concepts in the clinical free text into an assertion category is presented. There are six different categories of assertions for the task: Present, Absent, Possible, Conditional, Hypothetical and Not associated with the patient. The assertion classification algorithms were largely based on extending the popular NegEx and Context algorithms. In addition, a health based clinical terminology called SNOMED CT and other publicly available dictionaries were used to classify assertions, which did not fit the NegEx/Context model. The data for this task includes discharge summaries from Partners HealthCare and from Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Centre, as well as discharge summaries and progress notes from University of Pittsburgh Medical Centre. The set consists of 349 discharge reports, each with pairs of ground truth concept and assertion files for system development, and 477 reports for evaluation. The system’s performance on the evaluation data set was 0.83, 0.83 and 0.83 for recall, precision and F1-measure, respectively. Although the rule-based system shows promise, further improvements can be made by incorporating machine learning approaches

The Death of Metaphysical Analyticity and the Failure of Boghossian's Analytic Theory of the A Priori

Many philosophers still believe that metaphysically analytic sentences exist, where a sentence is understood to be metaphysically analytic if and only if it is true solely in virtue of its meaning. I provide two arguments against this claim and hence conclude that metaphysically analytic sentences do not exist. Still, some philosophers, however, hold out hope that epistemically analytic sentences exist, where a sentence is epistemically analytic if and only if an agent's understanding the sentence suffices for the agent to be justified in believing that this sentence is true. One such philosopher is Paul Boghossian, whose so-called analytic theory of the a priori is intended to show how epistemically analytic sentences can explain our a priori knowledge of the truths about logic. His theory, however, relies on the dubious Argument by Implicit Definition. I provide an objection to this argument and hence conclude that Boghossian's analytic theory of the a priori fails to vindicate the notion of epistemic analyticity. Still, I concede that just because Boghossian's attempt to do so fails, it does not follow that the notion of epistemic analyticity cannot, in another way, be vindicated

Deflationary Nominalism’s Commitment to Meinongianism

Deflationary nominalism is a novel view in the philosophy of mathematics on which there are mathematical statements, such as ‘There are prime numbers’ that are literally true despite the nonexistence of any mathematical objects. In this paper, I outline the deflationary nominalism of Azzouni, the most prominent contemporary defender of deflationary nominalism. I then object that it is committed to some form of Meinongianism. Because I believe that any view’s commitment to Meinongianism constitutes a strong reason in favor of rejecting that view, I suggest that deflationary nominalism should be rejected. Finally, I conclude that realism about mathematical objects must be accepted if we are to understand true mathematical statements as being literally true

The Death of Metaphysical Analyticity and the Failure of Boghossian’s Analytic Theory of the A Priori

Many philosophers still believe that metaphysically analytic sentences exist, where a sentence is understood to be metaphysically analytic if and only if it is true solely in virtue of its meaning. I provide two arguments against this claim and hence conclude that metaphysically analytic sentences do not exist. Still, some philosophers, however, hold out hope that epistemically analytic sentences exist, where a sentence is epistemically analytic if and only if an agent’s understanding the sentence suffices for the agent to be justified in believing that this sentence is true. One such philosopher is Paul Boghossian, whose so-called analytic theory of the a priori is intended to show how epistemically analytic sentences can explain our a priori knowledge of the truths about logic. His theory, however, relies on the dubious Argument by Implicit Definition. I provide an objection to this argument and hence conclude that Boghossian’s analytic theory of the a priori fails to vindicate the notion of epistemic analyticity. Still, I concede that just because Boghossian’s attempt to do so fails, it does not follow that the notion of epistemic analyticity cannot, in another way, be vindicated

Deflationary Nominalism’s Commitment to Meinongianism

Deflationary nominalism is a novel view in the philosophy of mathematics on which there are mathematical statements, such as ‘There are prime numbers’ that are literally true despite the nonexistence of any mathematical objects. In this paper, I outline the deflationary nominalism of Azzouni, the most prominent contemporary defender of deflationary nominalism. I then object that it is committed to some form of Meinongianism. Because I believe that any view’s commitment to Meinongianism constitutes a strong reason in favor of rejecting that view, I suggest that deflationary nominalism should be rejected. Finally, I conclude that realism about mathematical objects must be accepted if we are to understand true mathematical statements as being literally true

Development of a Bilayer Metallization for RIT\u27s Existing CMOS Process

The design and fabrication of a two-level subtractive aluminum metal backend was completed at the Rochester Institute of Technology. Metall-Metal2 (M1-M2) via chains were used as electrical test structures and tested operational. The optimal process uses 4000A of LTO for an ILD, a non-heated metal2 aluminum sputter deposition, and a chlorine-based plasma for metal etch. Resistance measurements taken through via chains produced values of —400Ω. While an ideal aluminum bar of the via chain’s dimensions should have a resistance of —100Ω, a contact resistance exists at each via throughout the chain and increases the resistance value. Capacitors were also electrically tested to determine ILD effectiveness. A 200 μm x 200 μm M1-ILD-M2 capacitor has a theoretical value of 3.5pF and the measured structures ranged from 3.01pF to 3.45pF. In addition to demonstrating that the first and second level metal lines could make electrical contact through via openings, testing was done to ensure electrical separation existed when needed. Metal2 lines overlapping metall lines were tested and measured to be electrically isolated, shown in Figures 4-6. This process has created a bilayer metallization design that allows for multilevel aluminum connections and electrical isolation where needed and can be readily implemented in RIT’s present CMOS

Can Hume Deny Reid's Dilemma?

Reid’s dilemma concludes that, whether the idea associated with a denied proposition is lively or faint, Hume is committed to saying that it is either believed or merely conceived. In neither case would there be denial. If so, then Hume cannot give an adequate account of denial. I consider and reject Powell’s suggestion that Hume could have advanced a “Content Contrary” account of denial that avoids Reid’s dilemma. However, not only would a Humean Content Contrary account be viciously circular, textual evidence suggests that Hume did not hold such an account. I then argue that Govier’s distinction between force and vivacity cannot help Hume. Not only did Hume fail to recognize this distinction, we can advance a variant of Reid’s dilemma even if we distinguish force from vivacity